Strict liability within the Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act 2011 by Carter, James
 1 
 
JAMES CARTER 
 
 
STRICT LIABILITY WITHIN THE COPYRIGHT 
(INFRINGING FILE SHARING) AMENDMENT ACT 
2011 
 
 
Submitted for the LLB Honours Degree 
 
Faculty of Law 
University of Wellington 
2013 
 
 
 2 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines strict liability within the Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) 
Amendment Act 2011. Prior to the act, enforcing copyright infringement by file sharing 
was unrealistic due to detection, evidentiary and authorisation problems. The Act 
resolved these problems by imposing strict liability in the form of vicarious liability and 
evidentiary presumptions. First, it explores the decision to hold account holders 
vicariously liable for end user infringements in relation to policy considerations and fact 
patterns arising in Copyright Tribunal decisions. In doing so, it highlights ways in which 
injustice may be avoided. Second, it explores the evidentiary presumptions, the 
underlying policy rationale for their inclusion and the Copyright Tribunal’s application of 
them. Ultimately, it argues that there is good reason to remove the evidentiary 
presumptions. 
Key Words: File Sharing, Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act 2011, 
Copyright Tribunal, Vicarious Liability, Evidentiary Presumptions. 
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I Introduction 
A   Peer-to-Peer: A data dissemination revolution 
Throughout history technological advancements have challenged intellectual property 
law. In particular, the evolution of information dissemination technology has provoked 
legislative response. For example, the printing press’ capacity for relatively cheap, 
ubiquitous and uniform information dissemination prompted various reforms. In 1662, it 
inspired the Licensing of the Press Act, designed to supress the printing of seditious 
material.1 2 Later, in 1710, as political tolerance grew and the need for economic incentive 
was realised, the printing press encouraged the Statute of Anne, “the first copyright 
statute ever passed by a legislature”.3 4  
Now in 2013, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing software can be couched as the most recent 
innovation in dissemination technology which requires legislative response. If differs from 
the conventional client-server method of internet information dissemination in which 
users download entire files from a centralised server, usually in the form of a website.5 
Where this system is used for copyright infringement, the party hosting the server offers a 
                                                           
1
 Licensing of the Press Act 1662 (UK) 14 Car c 33. 
2
 Raymond Astbury “The Renewal of the Licensing Act in 1693 and its Lapse in 1695” (1978) s5-XXXIII 
Library 296 at 296.  
3
 The Statute of Anne 1710 (UK) 8 Anne c 33.  
4
 Thomas Morris “The Origins of the Statute of Anne” (1962) 12 Copyright L Symp (ASCAP) 222 at 222. 
5
 William Hosch “client-server architecture” (February 19 2009) Encyclopaedia Britannica 
<www.britannica.com>.  
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pragmatic defendant. The on-going legal pursuit of Megaupload by United States 
authorities is an example of action taken against servers hosting infringing material.6 
Conversely, P2P software fragments files, such as copyright protected digital media like 
music, and enables many different users to share these fragments.7 This decentralises 
downloading, yielding no single easily identifiable party to pursue in a copyright 
infringement case. Furthermore, most P2P software employs a default function whereby 
the file being downloaded is simultaneously uploaded to other users. Once downloaded, 
unless removed, a file may remain uploading. This function has been highlighted by the 
High Court of Australia.8  
Thus, when one downloads copyrighted material using BitTorrent they are not only liable 
for copying that work but also, usually unwittingly, of communicating that work to 
thousands of potential uploaders. The P2P method of file sharing is pervasive. Studies 
reveal it has led to copyright law being “infringed hundreds of millions of times per day 
around the world.”9 In New Zealand, 779,000 people are estimated to participate in illegal 
file sharing each month.10 The Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act (the Act) 
represents a legislative response to file sharing software. 
 
                                                           
6
 See Toby Manhire “Kim Dotcom and Megaupload: a timeline” New Zealand Listener (online ed, 29 August 
2013) 
7
 William Hosch “P2P” (February 19 2009) Encyclopaedia Britannica <www.britannica.com>. 
8 Roadshow Films v iiNet [2012] HCA 16 at [21]. 
9
 Alexandre Mateus and Jon Peha “Quantifying Global Transfers of Copyright Content using BitTorrent” (6 
September 2011) Social Science Research Network <www.ssrn.com> at 36. 
10
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 3728 [2013] NZCOP 8 at [28]. 
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B   Claims in absence of the Act 
A copyright owner could detect P2P infringement through detection services like 
MarkMonitor. These detection methods are limited as they can only identify Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses.11 IP addresses could be traced back to the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) who assigned it to the account holder. An ISP may be required by an 
interlocutory order to reveal the contact details of the account holder using the infringing 
IP address so that a copyright owner may initiate proceedings.12 To establish liability the 
copyright owner would have to show evidence that the account holder in fact infringed 
either by ‘copying’ (via downloading) or by ‘communicating’ (via uploading) the work per s 
16(1)(a) or s 16(1)(d) of the Copyright Act 1994. This would involve climbing complex 
evidentiary hurdles inherent in file sharing. Whether simply pointing to the detection 
techniques used by the copyright owner would satisfy this factual inquiry is unknown.  
Furthermore, the customer may claim that they themselves did not commit the infringing 
act, rather an end user of their account did. The copyright owner would then have to 
prove that the account holder authorised the infringing act per s 16(1)(f) of the Copyright 
Act, or pursue a separate action against the end user. An action against the end user 
would encounter detection difficulties, as the only practical means of identifying 
infringement is through the account holder’s IP address. Coupled with litigation fees, this 
uncertainty has chilled file sharing copyright enforcement. 
                                                           
11
 InternetNZ “FAQs: Won’t copyright owners only go after people who do a lot of downloading?” 3strikesnz 
<www.3strikes.net.nz>. 
12
 District Court Rules, r 5.1.3. 
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C   Approach of this paper 
This paper will examine the Act’s attempts to overcome these authorisation, detection 
and evidentiary hurdles by imposing two elements of strict liability in the form of vicarious 
liability and evidentiary presumptions. Under the Act’s regime an account holder is 
vicariously liable for the file sharing infringing activities of the end users of his or her 
account. This nullifies concern regarding proving authorisation on the part of the account 
holder in the case of end user infringement. The Act also provides for evidentiary 
presumptions in favour of the copyright owner. This negates concerns surrounding the 
evidentiary hurdles in finding liability and expedites the process by eschewing costly and 
time consuming evidentiary disputes. 
The first part of this paper will examine vicarious liability within the Act. It will delineate 
the provisions which prescribe vicarious liability and explore underlying policy 
considerations. It will then inspect the Copyright Tribunal’s (the Tribunal) interpretation of 
provisions which potentially temper vicarious liability in relation to certain fact patterns 
arising in Tribunal proceedings. These provisions consist of the discretion to include end 
users in proceedings, the manifestly unjust exception and penalty sum determination. It 
will offer recommendations as to amendments and Tribunal approaches which could 
reduce potential injustices brought about by vicarious liability. 
The second part of this paper will closely examine the evidentiary presumptions provided 
by s 122N in conjunction with the Tribunal’s interpretation and application of this section. 
It will argue that s 122N, when read together with s 122O, can be understood as imposing 
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strict liability on the account holder as all factors necessary to establish liability are 
presumed. The policy of this dynamic will be considered. It then will examine the degree 
of this strictness by examining the interplay between s 122N(2) and s 122N(3), which, 
respectively, allow for the presumptions to be rebutted and that rebuttal itself to be 
refuted. Ultimately, it will be argued there is good reason to remove these presumptions. 
D   The Act’s regime 
Broadly speaking, the Act established a sui generis ‘three strikes’ regime governed by the 
Tribunal which functions as such: copyright owners hire independent contractors, usually 
MarkMonitor, to detect the IP address at which the infringements occur. 13 The copyright 
owners then pass this information on to ISPs (who are referred to as Internet Protocol 
Address Providers under the Act).14 Using this information, ISPs are bound to issue up to 
three infringement notices to the account holder possessing the IP address; a detection, 
warning and enforcement notice.15 After an enforcement notice is issued, the copyright 
owner may seek an order from the Tribunal for an award of a sum up to $15,000 payable 
by the account holder.16 To date, every single applicant at the Tribunal has been the 
Recording Industry Association of New Zealand (RIANZ), a trade-association dominated by 
the New Zealand based subsidiaries of the ‘big three’ international music labels.17 
 
                                                           
13
 See RIANZ v TCLE[A]-T5877102 [2013] NZCOP 2 at [21]; RIANZ v CAL2013-E000614 [2013] NZCOP 3 at [14]; 
RIANZ v Telecom NZ 3553 [2013] NZCOP 6 at [13]. 
14
 Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act 2011, s 122B(2). 
15
 Ibid, s 122B(3). 
16
 Ibid, s 122B(4)(a). 
17
 “About RIANZ: Full Members” rianz <rianz.org.nz>. 
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II   Provisions Which Prescribe Vicarious Liability 
A   Strict vicarious liability 
The Act defines “infringement” as “an incidence of file sharing that involves the 
infringement of copyright in a work by a user” (emphasis added).18  This definition is 
significant for two reasons.  
First, the word ‘user’ clarifies that an account holder need not commit the infringing act; it 
may be an end user. When coupled with s 122O(1)(a)(ii), which only requires that the 
infringement occurred at an IP address of the account holder, this holds the account 
holder liable for the actions of the end user; that is, it imposes vicarious liability.  
Secondly, the Act’s definition of infringement could be read as imposing a form of strict 
liability, the form of which does not require intention but only fault. It requires only ‘an 
incidence of the file sharing that involves infringement’. File sharing may be used for legal 
means and a user who recklessly infringes in the course of file sharing is just as liable, 
under this definition, as those who intentionally infringe. 
The account holder is subject to the penalties and obligations arising in the case of an 
infringement. Section 122O(1) stipulates that “the Tribunal must order an account holder 
to pay a sum” where certain conditions are satisfied. Section 122D requires that an ISP 
must issue a detection notice to an “account holder” where an alleged infringement is 
                                                           
18
 Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act 2011,  s 122A(1). 
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matched with the account holder’s IP address.19 It also provides for the form of the notice, 
requiring that the consequences to the “account holder” of further infringement are made 
clear.20 Likewise, information on how the “account holder” can challenge the notice must 
be included.21 No reference is made to the actual infringer. 
The following sections, 122E and 122F, follow a similar pattern to s 122D. However, a 
peculiar anomaly exists. Section 122E(2)(e) specifies that a warning notice must “identify 
any other alleged infringements by the account holder against that rights owner that have 
occurred since the date of the preceding detection notice” (emphasis added). In contrast, 
s 122F(2)(e) provides that an enforcement notice must “identify any other alleged 
infringements against the rights owner that have occurred since the date of the preceding 
detection notice” (emphasis added).  
If s 122E(2)(e) is read literally, the second infringement notice, the warning notice, only 
need reference infringements carried out by the actual account holder. Whilst the third 
notice, the enforcement notice, must refer to all other infringements carried out under 
that IP address, since “against” is open and may include vicarious infringement on the part 
of an end user. This anomaly is softened by the fact that an ISP is still bound to issue a 
warning notice in the case of end user infringement per s 122E(1), but s 122E(2)(e) 
suggests warning notices need not identify any infringements by non-account holders. 
This incongruity has not been addressed by the Tribunal and, as there is no discernible 
reason for a discrepancy between notices, it may be attributed to a drafting error. 
                                                           
19
 Ibid, s 122D(1). 
20
 Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act 2011, s 122D(2)(e). 
21
 Ibid, s 122D(2)(d). 
 11 
 
Section 122G provides that it is the account holder, not the actual infringer, who may 
challenge the notice.22 Likewise ss 122I and 122J clarify that, upon the issuing of an 
enforcement notice, the copyright owner may only take action against the account holder, 
as opposed to the actual infringer, in requesting the penalty fee and the amount of such a 
sum.23 Section 122L(e) allows the Tribunal to consider any timely submissions by the 
account holder, before the proceedings. Again, no reference is made to the end user. 
B   Policy rationale for vicarious liability 
As discussed, the base reason for vicarious liability is that it eschews the authorisation and 
detection obstacles and allows for realistic copyright enforcement action in the file 
sharing context. Vicarious liability also appears to be the most expeditious means of 
educating “the public about illegal file-sharing”; a routinely cited purpose of the Act.24 
Indeed, many submissions by respondents in Tribunal proceedings illustrate such 
ignorance on the part of end users.25 Account holders are the only detectable party and 
are in a position to regulate the use of their internet account. They essentially become 
agents of the state responsible for deterring infringing file sharing. 
However, to qualify as fair policy, this imposition of vicarious liability should require 
something beyond convenience. In employment vicarious liability, an employer is liable 
for economic reasons. Employers have the deepest pockets and derive benefit from 
                                                           
22
 Ibid, s 122G(1). 
23
 Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Act 2011, s 122I(1). 
24
 (22 April 2010) 662 NZPD (accessed online). 
25
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 2592 [2013] NZCOP 1 at [9]; RIANZ v CAL2012-E000627 [2013] NZCOP 9 at [18]. 
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employee actions.26 In most settings it is safe to infer that an account holder has the 
deepest pockets as they pay the bills. However, significant exceptions exist, such as 
flatting arrangements. Furthermore, an account holder gains no benefit from end users’ 
use. 
It could be argued that by contracting with an ISP an account holder is deemed to have 
assumed responsibility for all actions undertaken on that account. This is substantiated 
upon examination of contracts between ISPs and account holders which render the 
account holder liable for data usage fees, even that usage arising from unauthorised use.27 
This imposition of responsibility in the context of infringing file sharing may be likened to 
minor driving offenses. The owner of a vehicle may be found liable for parking and 
speeding offenses committed through the use of their vehicle by other people. 28 
Parliamentary debate during the passage of the Bill involved allusions to the rights and 
corollary responsibilities of drivers.29 The RIANZ has repeatedly compared the Act’s regime 
to land transport offenses in its submissions.30 
Vicarious liability of a vehicle owner in a land transport context can be rationalised by a 
clear assumption of responsibility. When an owner passes over the keys they are deemed 
to assume responsibility for certain speeding and parking offenses committed by the 
                                                           
26
 Kartikey Mahajan “Corporate Criminal Liability: Why Corporations are Preferred and Not the Employees?” 
(6 May 2010) Social Science Research Network <www.ssrn.com> at 18-19. 
27
 see “Telecom Broadband terms and conditions” Telecom NZ <www.telecom.co.nz> at cl 9 and; “Orcon 
Terms and Conditions” Orcon <www.orcon.net.nz> at cl 5.1.  
28
 see Land Transport Act 1998, ss 133 and 133A. 
29
 (12 April 2011) 671 NZPD (accessed online). 
30
 see RIANZ v TCLE[A]-T5877102 [2013] NZCOP 2 at [83]; RIANZ v Telecom NZ 3553 [2013] NZCOP 6 at [41]; 
RIANZ v CAL2012-E000627 [2013] NZCOP 9 at [77]. 
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driver. This is evidenced by discretion to pardon the owner where possession was lost 
through theft, as in this case no assumption has taken place.31  
This assumption of responsibility on the part of account holder in regards to end user 
activity is not as clear. No ‘passing of the keys’ moment exists. Arguably, the account 
holder’s signing of a contract with an ISP assumes the responsibility for all activities 
undertaken under the resulting internet account. However, as most contracts’ formation 
pre-date the passage of the Act, this deemed assumption is retrospective in many cases. 
Regardless, it is not a salient assumption of responsibility pertaining to end user copyright 
infringement. This could be remedied through an advertisement campaign outlining an 
account holder’s responsibilities. Continued use could be perceived as consent to this 
advertised assumption. Parliament could also allow for the amendment of the parties to 
ISP contracts to address flat settings where a single tenant has taken responsibility. This 
would ensure account holder’s clearly assumed responsibility for copyright infringing 
activities. 
III   Provisions which Temper Vicarious Liability 
Certain fact patterns have arisen in Tribunal proceedings which illustrate the potential for 
injustice of vicarious liability in the file sharing context. These will be discussed in relation 
to provisions which the Tribunal could have utilised in order to ameliorate this injustice. 
 
                                                           
31
 see Land Transport Act 1998, s 269 of LTA (2)(a)(iii). 
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A   Tribunal discretion to include end user infringers as part of proceedings 
Section 122K(3) stipulates the default parties to proceedings before the Tribunal are the 
applicant rights owner and the respondent account holder. Section 122K(3)(c) provides 
the Tribunal with the discretion contained in s 212(2) the Copyright Act 1994. This entails 
the ability to direct a person to be joined to the proceedings where the Tribunal is 
satisfied that said person has “a substantial interest in matter”. 
In [2013] NZCOP 10, it was submitted that the relevant infringements were committed by 
a resident of respondent’s address who was willing to take responsibility for the 
infringement.32 The Tribunal responded by stating that the Act clearly makes the account 
holder responsible, per s 12O(1), implying it is bound to issue the penalty to the 
respondent.33  
The Tribunal chose not to exercise its discretion under s 122K(3)(c) to include the resident 
of the respondent as a part of the proceedings. The resident indubitably had “a substantial 
interest in the matter” per s 212(2) of the parent Act, as he or she had taken responsibility 
for the infringement and it is likely that the penalty will be privately passed on to him or 
her. 
However, as s 122O(1) makes clear, the penalty fee may only be attributed to the account 
holder. The Act provides no authority for the Tribunal to transfer liability for the awarded 
                                                           
32
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 4296 [2013] NZCOP 10 at [17]. 
33
 Ibid at [18]. 
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sum from the account holder to the infringing end user. The Tribunal has no means of 
ensuring this private transfer of the penalty fee takes place.  
Section 122K(3)(c) was probably included for educational purposes as it is not 
accompanied with the authority to charge infringing end users. In the context of minor 
land transport offenses, discretion exists to charge either the person who allegedly 
committed the offense or the owner of the vehicle.34 The Act should provide similar 
discretion where an end user admits to the infringing act.  
B   The manifestly unjust provision 
Section 122O(5) provides the Tribunal with broad discretion to decline to award the 
copyright owner a fee payable by the account holder if they consider such payment would 
be manifestly unjust to the account holder.  The Tribunal dismissed judicial precedent 
regarding the meaning of ‘flagrancy’ due to the quasi-judicial nature of the Tribunal.35 It 
could be inferred that the same applies to judicial authority on ‘manifest injustice’. To 
date, the Tribunal has yet to satisfy s 122O(5), despite facts which indicate manifest 
injustice. 
1 Wi-Fi hackers: claims of unauthorised use 
The decision in [2013] NZCOP 1, 7 and 13 involved submissions by the respondent which 
inferred that an unauthorised third party, such as a Wi-Fi hacker, was responsible for the 
                                                           
34
 See Land Transport Act 1998, ss 133(1) and 133A(1). 
35
 RIANZ v CAL2013-E000614 [2013] NZCOP 3 at [34]. 
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infringing activity.36 In each case, the Tribunal held these allegations were insufficient to 
engage s 122O(5).37 If these allegations were true, the Tribunal’s refusal to engage s 
12O(5) would contradict the ordinary meaning of ‘manifestly unjust’. It is demonstrably 
unfair to hold an account holder liable for the actions of an illegal actor whom they 
exercise no control over. Perhaps this accords with the educative intent of the Act, as it 
would incentivise the strengthening of Wi-Fi security. However, the Tribunal has not 
discussed this policy. Instead, it dismissed these claims on evidentiary grounds. 
In [2013] NZCOP 1 the respondent admitted to the infringements prompting the first two 
infringement notices, but denied the third through an implication of unauthorised use by 
a third party.38 It was open for the Tribunal to reject the respondent’s unsubstantiated 
claim on the grounds that she had already admitted to previous infringements of the same 
song and had file sharing software installed.39 It is likely the default uploading function 
caused the third infringement: an uploading of the same song identified in the second 
notice. However, the Tribunal, in dismissing claims of unauthorised use, concluded it was 
“satisfied that file sharing took place via the respondent’s internet account”.40 It then 
dismissed s 122O(5), only peripherally alluding to it.41  
The Tribunal’s conclusion does nothing to dispel the notion that a third party could have 
hacked into the account in order to commit the infringing act. It may have been prudent 
                                                           
36
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 2592 [2013] NZCOP 1 at [9]; RIANZ v Telecom NZ 3663 [2013] NZCOP 7 at [5]; RIANZ v 
Telecom NZ 2688 [2013] NZCOP 13 [36]. 
37
 [2013] NZCOP 1 [16]-[17]; [2013] NZCOP 7 at [8]; [2013] NZCOP 13 at [36]. 
38
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 2592 [2013] NZCOP 1 at [9]. 
39
 Ibid at [9]. 
40
 Ibid at [14]. 
41
 Ibid at [16]-[17]. 
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for the Tribunal to make it clear that they were not accepting the respondent’s excuse 
before dismissing s 122O(5). This would give future respondents a better idea of how to 
guard themselves against infringement notices consisting of unauthorised third party 
infringement and how to compile evidence in proof of this. 
In [2013] NZCOP 7, The Tribunal considered the respondent’s inference of unauthorised 
use “irrelevant to liability”.42 This conclusion is correct per s 122O(1)(a)(ii), which only 
requires that the infringement occurred at the account holders IP address. This would still 
occur in the case of Wi-Fi hacking. However, it is not irrelevant to manifest injustice. The 
Tribunal engaged in a tangential analysis of s 122(2) and s 122(3), in which it tentatively 
concluded the evidentiary presumptions stood.43 However, this analysis only resolved that 
the file sharing occurred at the IP address of the account holder, which does nothing to 
dispel the presence of Wi-Fi hacking. Regardless, the Tribunal did “not consider that s 
122O(5) applies” and neglected to undertake a significant manifestly unjust analysis.44  
Again, it may have been prudent for the Tribunal to determine the validity of the 
respondent’s inference of Wi-Fi hacking before dismissing s 122O(5).  
An evidentiary analysis of respondents’ claims of unauthorised use would encounter 
numerous and insurmountable hurdles. The Tribunal will almost always lack the evidence 
to deduce whether Wi-Fi hacking occurred. Procuring the relevant evidence in proof of 
unauthorised access is beyond the technical capacity of the average respondent. 
                                                           
42
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 3663 [2013] NZCOP 7 at [16]. 
43
 See Part V of this paper. 
44
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 3663 [2013] NZCOP 7 at [8]. 
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Accepting unsubstantiated claims would open the floodgates to erroneous assertions. 
Furthermore, “manifestly” per s 122O(5)  suggests an evidenced reason is required.  
The evidentiary problems facing an average respondent in evidencing unauthorised use 
are illustrated in [2013] NZCOP 13. Here the Tribunal, unlike in [2013] NZCOP 1 and 7, 
undertook a thorough examination of the respondent’s claim of unauthorised use. The 
Tribunal emphasised that there was no attempt to substantiate the evidence suggesting 
unauthorised use (that nobody was home when infringement occurred) and that no 
reason was provided as to why the respondent never installed a Wi-Fi password.45  
The Tribunal also took into account the applicant’s advice to the respondent to search for 
and delete file sharing software in the case of inadvertent infringement.46 However, this 
advice occurred after liability was prima facie established through the issuing of the 
enforcement notice, therefore should not be considered relevant. Nevertheless, [2013] 
NZCOP 13 is a step in the right direction as it gives due credence to unauthorised use 
allegations and gives future respondents an indication of how to successfully satisfy s 
122O(5) by evidencing claims of unauthorised use. 
The decision in [2013] NZCOP  13 illustrates that proper attention is now being given to 
claims of unauthorised use. Empowering account holders to evidence such claims could be 
achieved with a simple amendment. The Act’s regulations stipulate what information 
must be contained in infringement notices.47 These could be amended to include 
                                                           
45
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 2688 [2013] NZCOP 13 at [36]. 
46
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 2688 [2013] NZCOP 13 at [35]. 
47
 Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Regulations 2011, reg 5. 
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information on how to prevent and detect Wi-Fi hacking. This would both prevent 
unauthorised use and provide less knowledgeable account holders with the tools to 
substantiate genuine claims of Wi-Fi hacking.  
Information on Wi-Fi security is contained in information provided by the Ministry of 
Economic Development (now the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment), a 
link to which is required in detection notices.48 However, this information only relates to 
hacking prevention, and, as will be discussed shortly, has proven inaccessible to some 
account holders. 
2 Technological incapacity and inadvertent infringement 
Technological incapacity resulting in the ignorance of the default uploading function of file 
sharing software significantly increases the likelihood of inadvertent infringement. The 
allegations of unauthorised user infringements may be made due to ignorance of this 
uploading function.  Opponents of the Act argued it is likely to punish such ignorance. 49 
However, the intention of the Act was arguably to educate this ignorance. A technological 
divide between generations is clear. A study revealed youth orientated content is 
disproportionately reflected in P2P traffic.50 In a family context, it seems unjust to require 
the less knowledgeable account holder (generally the parent) to police the technologically 
savvy end user (generally the child). 
                                                           
48
 Ibid reg 5(1)(e). 
49
 InternetNZ “Here’s why we don’t like the new law” 3strikesnz <www.3strikes.net.nz>. 
50
 Alexandre Mateus and Jon Peha “Quantifying Global Transfers of Copyright Content using BitTorrent” (6 
September 2011) Social Science Research Network <www.ssrn.com> at 37. 
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It could be argued this knowledge disparity is relieved by information provided by the 
Ministry of Economic Development (MED), a link to which is required in detection 
notices.51 This information explains how to prevent file sharing.52 However, in practice this 
information has had little effect. 
In [2013] NZCOP 2, the respondent argued he lacked the ability to prevent end user 
infringement. He highlighted the fact that he had very little computer literacy.53 The 
Tribunal dispelled any notion of manifest unjustness by pointing to the fact that the 
respondent had the technical know-how to uninstall file sharing software after the third 
notice.54 That the Tribunal found it necessary to prove some form of computer literacy on 
the part of the account holder suggests complete computer illiteracy may be grounds for 
finding manifest injustice. 
In [2013] NZCOP 6, the respondent submission was as follows.55 After the first detection 
notice the respondent warned their three young children. A second notice arrived, and 
the respondent singled out the child responsible and provided further warning. However, 
a third notice arrived, triggered by the uploading of the same song which gave rise to the 
second notice. They noted that they had then taken further action, with the help of a 
friend, by updating all passwords to ensure the children would not have internet access 
                                                           
51
 Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Regulations 2011, reg 5(1)(e). 
52
 Ministry of Economic Development “Notice Regime Under Sections 122A to U of the Copyright Act. How 
Does it Work?” Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment <www.med.govt.nz> at 7.  
53
 RIANZ v TCLE[A]-T5877102 [2013] NZCOP 2 at [17]. 
54
 Ibid at [30]. 
55
 RIANZ v Telecom NZ 3553 [2013]  NZCOP 6 at [17]. 
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without their supervision.56 The Tribunal did not consider that a family situation wherein 
blame had been cast upon the children coupled with the parents’ computer illiteracy gave 
rise to manifest injustice.57  
In [2013] NZCOP 12, it transpired that the infringing activity was caused by a visitor who 
had been unwittingly uploading a song which had been downloaded two years earlier.58 
The respondent was technologically illiterate but took proactive steps to prevent the 
infringement and sought help from his ISP, which was not forthcoming until after the issue 
of the enforcement notice.59 The Tribunal, when declining to engage s 122O(5), decided 
that respondent should have sought advice from other parties rather than the ISP.60 It also 
considered that, since the applicant did not challenge the first two notices, the applicant 
could not have given advice regarding file sharing software.61 
It is interesting to note that the Tribunal did not mention the information provided by the 
MED even though it is required to be linked to by infringement notices.62 This contained 
all the advice necessary to identify the visitor’s inadvertent uploading. Similarly, in [2013] 
NZCOP 7, the applicant was punished by a reduction of the penalty sum per s 122O(3)(a) 
for acknowledging that the infringement was likely caused through an automated 
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uploading function of P2P software, and yet, they failed to inform the respondent of this 
or how to prevent it.63 Again, the MED information went unacknowledged.  
The Tribunal’s unwillingness to engage s 122O(5) in relation to technical incapacity likely 
reflects the educative function of the Act. However, certain changes could be made to 
prevent these inadvertent infringements from advancing to the Tribunal. The MED 
information appears to be inaccessible to some account holders. It requires scrutiny of the 
infringement notice to obtain the link to the MED website, exploration of that website to 
locate the relevant document, and finally, discovering the relevant information within that 
document. 
The regulations could be amended to provide this information appears on the 
infringement notices.64 In particular, more detailed information regarding the default 
uploading function of file sharing software and information on how to locate and uninstall 
this software should be included. This would effectively reduce the injustice caused by 
forcing technologically illiterate account holders to police more knowledgeable users. 
C   Absence of account holder 
In [2013] NZCOP 5 the respondent’s submission to the Tribunal raised good reason for 
engaging s 122O(5).65 The respondent had just returned from military deployment 
overseas and was unaware of any downloading which took place during his absence. He 
could not determine which of the eight people with access to his internet IP address 
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committed the infringing act as many of his flatmates were now dispersed around New 
Zealand. He also expressed apprehension in partaking in the proceedings due to the 
difficult transition from military to civilian life. He did, however, acknowledge he was 
responsible for the actions committed under his IP address and indicated a willingness to 
co-operate with the Tribunal. 
Surprisingly, the Tribunal did not even consider whether s 122O(5) was engaged. The 
judgement only gives the provision a passing mention, suggesting it did not consider it an 
issue.66 The only indication it gives towards the respondent’s arguable innocence is a 
comment that the level of infringement was “not at the serious end of the scale”.67 
This implies a very high standard is demanded when activating s 122O(5). The Tribunal 
referred to the first two notices as serving an “educative” function.68  However, given his 
absence, the respondent lacked the capacity to police the use of his internet and 
admonish the end users when these first two infringement notices were sent. The 
educative role of the notices are completely void considering the position of the 
respondent. 
Any deterrent effect relies on the end users (in this case the flatmates) relationship with 
the account holder.  The respondent submitted he had “spoken to the pers [sic] who have 
access to my internet IP address”.69 However, any deterrent effect may be negated by an 
end user’s apathy towards the consequences forced upon the account holder. Thus, 
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arguably, the only purpose the Act serves in this context is to punish an innocent account 
holder. 
Rick Shera, an intellectual property lawyer specialising in internet law, concurred that it 
was open for the Tribunal to find manifest unjustness but conceded this would be difficult 
considering the respondent made no submission regarding injustice.70 However s 122O(5) 
only requires the “circumstances of the case” to satisfy it that an award would be 
manifestly unjust. The Tribunal need not rely on submissions invoking the defence.  
Furthermore, the respondent was likely ignorant of the manifestly unjust  defence, 
considering the Act’s regulations do not require infringement notices to inform the 
recipient of this defence, but only of their ability to challenge each notice.71 Such a 
challenge may provide the papers which may inform the Tribunal’s decision to invoke s 
122O(5). However, of course, in the circumstances, the respondent had no capacity to 
challenge the notices.  
The respondent’s inability to challenges notices due to military deployment is arguably 
grounds for a finding of manifest unjustness. Considering the decision in [2013] NZCOP 5, 
as Shera states, it is now “hard to imagine any circumstance” in which manifest injustice 
will be found.72 This case demonstrates the injustice which may be caused by imposing 
vicarious liability when coupled with a tentative approach to s 122O(5). 
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D   Determination of award sum 
The Tribunal’s application of provisions regulating the determination of the penalty sum 
has eased the harshness of vicarious liability. If the Tribunal lacked this discretion, it is 
likely it would be compelled into a liberal reading of s 122O(5). The average fee awarded 
in proceedings thus far is $521.69. 
Section 122O(3)(a) requires that the sum include a contribution to the cost incurred by the 
copyright owner when paying the ISP to issue an infringement notice (up to $25.00 per 
notice).73 The Tribunal, in order to reflect the educative role of each notice, has adopted a 
sliding scale. The respondent is liable for one-third the cost of the detection notice, two-
thirds the cost of the warning notice and the entire cost of the enforcement notice.74 In 
[2013] NZCOP 7 the Tribunal avoided determining the validity of the respondent’s 
inference of unauthorised, likely because of evidentiary difficulties.  
Instead, the Tribunal lowered the sum by highlighting a separate issue. It censured the 
applicant for suggesting the infringement was likely caused through an automated 
uploading function yet it failed to inform the respondent of this or how to prevent it. The 
Tribunal subsequently lowered the sum per s 12O(3)(a) for failing to fulfill the educative 
function of the notices.75 Perhaps this, along with evidentiary issues, explains the 
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Tribunal’s decision not to engage s 122O(5) and instead find another means to prescribe a 
“relatively modest award” of $276.78.76 
Section 122O(2) requires that the sum be determined in accordance with the Act’s 
regulations. The regulations stipulate the sum must include “an amount that the Tribunal 
considers appropriate as a deterrent against further infringing.” The regulations guide the 
calculation of this amount by binding the Tribunal to consider the flagrancy of the 
infringement, the possible effect on the market for the infringed work, and whether the 
sum thus far would constitute a sufficient deterrent.77  
The decision in [2013] NZCOP 7, in the face of unauthorised use allegations, saw the 
award of a relatively low deterrence fee of $50.00.78 In [2013] NZCOP 6, the Tribunal 
considered the family setting coupled with the respondent’s technological incapacity 
required only a deterrent fee of $60.00 with the total sum amounting to $316.97.79 In 
[2013] NZCOP 6, where the respondent was completely absent, both Tribunal and 
applicant agreed to completely waive any deterrent sum and the respondent was charged 
the lowest fee to date, $255.97.80 Similarly, in [2013] NZCOP 12, when the respondent was 
liable for a visitor’s inadvertent downloading, the deterrent fee was completely waived, 
resulting in a fee of $276.63.81 
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This lack of need for deterrence can be construed as a reflection of lack of guilt on the 
account holder’s part. In neglecting to find manifest injustice, The Tribunal, has turned to 
the deterrence fee as a means of recognising lack of guilt. If this discretion was not 
available, for example a fixed deterrent fee for each infringement was stipulated, it is 
more likely that s 122O(5) would be invoked. However, the fees guiding penalty sum 
determination allow the Tribunal to cast its eyes elsewhere, and, as in some cases, avoid a 
s 122O(5) inquiry altogether. 
E   Flagrancy of infringement 
A similar fee limiting approach could be adopted in regard to the flagrancy consideration 
in determination of a deterrent sum per reg 12(3)(a). This would directly address the 
vicarious liability component of the Act. As delineated in [2013] NZCOP 14, ‘flagrancy’ is 
considered in the narrow context of the deterrence sum rather than, as in the Copyright 
Act 1994, in the light of what justice requires.82 The Tribunal has stated that “flagrancy 
suggests something beyond the normal case”.83 The Tribunal has dismissed judicial 
precedent regarding the meaning of ‘flagrancy’ due to the quasi-judicial nature of the 
Tribunal.84 Therefore, it is open for the Tribunal to define this extra element required for 
flagrancy in the context of a sum deterring future infringing. 
A ‘normal case’ under the Act can be described as finding an incidence of file sharing 
resulting in an infringement  which occurred at the IP address of the account holder. This 
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incidence may be brought about by either the account holder or an end user, intentionally 
or otherwise. Where an account holder intentionally brings about this incidence him or 
herself, this could be described as ‘beyond the normal case’ as thus may qualify as 
flagrant.  
This would have the effect of creating a division between account holders intentionally 
infringing and those who those who did not. This dichotomy would reduce the harshness 
of the vicarious liability component by increasing deterrence for account holders 
intentionally infringing, and, by contrast, prescribing a lighter penalty for those who were 
unaware of end user infringement. This is within the flagrancy realm of deterrence, as 
intentional account holders require further deterrence as compared to unintentional 
account holders. 
One half of this proposed approach was, by inference, supported by the applicant’s 
submissions in [2013] NZCOP 7. The respondent claimed they were at work during the 
time of the infringement giving rise to the detection notice.85 The applicants stated in 
response that they did not contend the infringement was flagrant.86 This can be attributed 
to their acceptance of the respondent’s submission that they were at work during the 
infringement, thus could not have committed it themselves. The Tribunal viewed this 
“appropriate concession”.87 Therefore, both the Tribunal and the applicant have viewed it 
as appropriate to dismiss flagrancy contentions where it is shown that the account holder 
themselves did not partake in the infringing activity.  
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This approach may lead to respondents automatically denying involvement in 
infringement, but as [2013] NZCOP 1 illustrates, it is possible for respondents to admit 
intentional infringing.88 
IV   The Evidentiary Presumptions 
A   Reading section 122N(1) as imposing strict liability 
Section 122O(1) stipulates that where three factors are present an award must be made: 
1. That each of the three alleged infringements triggering the infringement notice 
constituted an infringement of the rights of the copyright owner;89 
2. That said infringements occurred at the IP address of the account holder; and 90 
3. That the three notices were issued in accordance with this Act.91 
The three evidentiary presumptions within s 122N(1) align with these required factors: 
1. Each incidence of file sharing identified in the infringement notices constituted an 
infringement; 92 
• This presumption satisfies factor one, as the two provisions are 
tantamount. 
2. That the information recorded in this notice is correct; and 93  
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• This presumption satisfies factor two, as the infringement notices must 
identify the account holders IP address.94 
3. That each infringement notice was issued in accordance with this Act.95 
• This presumption satisfies factor three, as the two provisions are 
tantamount. 
This demonstrates where the presumptions apply liability is automatically established. 
Section 122N(2) provides this presumption may be rebutted, but, s 122N(3) provides that 
the rebuttal itself may be negated. Therefore whether s 122N could be veritably described 
as imposing strict liability depends upon the threshold required to engage ss 122N(2) and 
122N(3). 
B   Policy rationale for evidentiary presumptions 
These presumptions address the problem of the evidentiary veil provided by private home 
internet use. It expedites the process by avoiding complex disputes regarding detection 
software. However, two issues raise concern. 
The first is the potential for erroneous detections. The RIANZ employs MarkMonitor when 
detecting infringements.96 This service identifies infringing IP addresses and provides 
“extensive forensic evidence”.97 The legislature has placed faith in such services as the 
evidentiary presumptions effectively presume detections by MarkMonitor constitute an 
incidence of infringing file sharing. An ‘independent’ assessment of MarkMonitor’s 
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methodology has found it robust, accurate and capable of withstanding scrutiny or 
evidentiary challenges.98 However, the conductor of this assessment was a former paid 
lobbyist for the Recording Industry Association of America (the parent association of 
RIANZ), and erroneous detections by MarkMonitor have been reported.99 Therefore, 
erroneous detections may possibly form the basis for infringement notices. 
Another issue is the possibility of altogether bogus claims. In a document referred to the 
Select Committee, Google Incorporated highlighted that of the notices it received under 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (US), 37% were not valid copyright claims.100 
Justice David Harvey, in a similar submission, stated that “some 30%” of copyright 
litigation fails on the grounds that the copyright owner does not hold the copyright and 
that such copyright is not governed by New Zealand law.101  
Section 122N(2) possibly remedies these issues by allowing an account holder to challenge 
the presumptions in the event of erroneous detection and bogus claims. However, the 
account holder, generally a single layperson, will often lack the technical capacity for such 
an exercise. For example, one respondent displayed “computer illiteracy”.102 Considering 
the resource asymmetry between a copyright holder, a well-funded association of global 
companies, and the typical account holder, there is a good argument to remove this 
presumption. Entities like RIANZ are in the better position to prove an actual infringement 
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occurred through validating detection software, rather for the account holder to disprove 
the infringement occurred.  
Regardless, the onus is on the account holder to reverse the evidentiary presumption. This 
task has proven exceedingly difficult. 
V   Rebutting the Evidentiary Presumptions 
Section 122N(2) allows an account holder to “submit evidence that, or give reasons why” 
any of the evidentiary presumptions should not apply. Where such submissions are made, 
s 122N(3) provides that the onus springs back to the copyright owner who must then 
“satisfy the Tribunal that” the presumptions are correct. [2013] NZCOP 7 and 9 involved 
detailed discussions of ss 122N(2) and 122N(3). 
A   The standard required to engage section 122N(2) 
It could be argued that bare claims are enough to engage s 122N(2). In [2013] NZCOP 7 
the Tribunal undertook a tangential discussion of the interplay between ss 122N(2) and 
122N(3) in the context of first two evidentiary presumptions. The respondents submitted 
to the Tribunal that the infringed work was not on any household computers, inferring 
unauthorised use occurred.103 The applicant replied by noting that “the account holder did 
not provide evidence or independent verification” to evidence this claim. 104  
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As discussed, an inference of unauthorised use is “irrelevant to liability” as the Act “makes 
the account holder liable”.105 The Tribunal, supposing hypothetically that this inference of 
unauthorised use could engage s 122(2), censured the applicant’s response, as it “belied” 
s 122N(3) by assuming that the onus to rebut the evidentiary presumption remained with 
the respondent, even after engaging s 122N(2).106 This hypothetical analysis indicates that 
unsubstantiated claims have the potential to engage s 122N(2). 
In [2013] NZCOP  9, the respondent alleged that they had not received any infringement 
notices from their Internet provider, only their monthly bill.107 Although the Tribunal did 
not explicitly allude to engagement of s 122N(2), it considered this submission raised an 
issue over the third presumption contained in s 122(N)(1)(c); that the infringement notice 
was issued in accordance with this Act. 108 It could be inferred that the Tribunal believed 
this bare allegation engaged s 122N(2) by constituting a “reason why” the presumption 
should not apply. This is supported by the Tribunal’s subsequent interpretation of the 
applicant’s response to this allegation, which may be construed as the applicant’s attempt 
to “satisfy” the court that the s 122N(1)(c) presumption was correct per s 122N(3).109 A 
contrary interpretation will be discussed later. 
This low standard is supported by a close reading of s 122N(2) which allows the user to 
submit  “evidence that, or give reasons why” the presumption does not apply (emphasis 
added). This suggests Parliament acknowledged a dichotomy between bare claims and 
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those supported by evidence, and chose to allow both. Section 122N(2)’s  proto-provision 
within the Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Bill read: 110 
“An account holder may submit evidence, or give reasons, that show that any 1 or 
more of the presumptions in subsection (1) do not apply with respect to any 
particular infringement identified in an infringement notice.” (emphasis added) 
The word “show”, which has been omitted from s 122N(2), conveys a higher threshold by 
indicating that the Tribunal must be convinced that the presumptions do not apply. Its 
removal suggests that Parliament acknowledged that the standard within the Bill was in 
appropriately high. Without “show”, the Tribunal need not be convinced of anything, it 
only requires for submissions to provide evidence that or reasons why the presumption 
should not apply. Once these are provided, s 122N(2) is engaged. 
From a policy perspective, it would make sense to require a higher standard of proof - that 
is sound evidence, when engaging s 122N(2).  Shera argued that if an unsubstantiated 
claim were able to rebut the evidentiary presumption, for example “it wasn’t me”, then 
this would “render the presumption no presumption at all”.111 Indeed, if unsubstantiated 
claims were accepted, it could open the floodgates whereby every single respondent 
would submit bare denials of infringing incidents. Although s 122N(3) would stem the flow 
caused by this potential torrent. 
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Countervailing policy considerations support a low standard. Section 122N(2) may operate 
as a check on bogus claims or those based on erroneous detection. In order to combat 
such claims, account holders with a firm belief that no infringement took place at their IP 
address may raise this point without further evidence. The problem of evidencing such a 
belief is resolved by a low standard of proof. However, this check could be nullified 
depending on the standard required to engage s 122N(3). 
B   The standard required to engage section 122N(3) 
In [2013] NZCOP 9 the applicants, in reaction to the respondent’s allegation that no 
infringement notices had been received, provided information from the ISP verifying 
notices had been sent to the physical and email address of the respondent.112 The 
Tribunal’s evaluation was twofold. Firstly, it emphasised since the respondent had 
received, via physical address, the formal notice informing them of the present 
proceedings, there was no reason to believe the respondent’s allegation.113 This alone 
could be enough to deduce the respondent’s allegation was spurious thus satisfying s 
122N(3).  
Secondly, the Tribunal highlighted the respondent’s failure to challenge the evidence 
provided by the ISP. 114  It also considered that no explanation as to why the infringement 
notices would not have reached her billing address had been offered.115 It could be argued 
that these second considerations were ultra vires. They may be subject to the same 
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tangential criticism which the Tribunal in [2013] NZCOP 7 levelled at the applicant’s reply 
to the respondent’s submission.116 That is that they belie s 122N(3), by assuming the onus 
is still on the respondent to rebut the presumptions, even after s 122N(2) is engaged.  The 
onus, after engagement of s 122N(2), rests solely upon the account holder. Any 
contemplation of the respondent’s failure to critique the evidence provided by the ISP in 
the applicant’s reply is immaterial. 
However, as the Tribunal in [2013] NZCOP 9 makes no explicit reference to ss 122N(2) or 
122N(3), it could be argued that the second class of considerations were relevant to the 
initial s 122N(2) rebuttal. That is, the respondent’s failure to critique the ISP evidence and 
provide evidence meant the claim towards s 122N(2) was unsubstantiated and thus void. 
This analysis should not be preferred as it contradicts the low standard which, as 
established above, should be required to engage s 122N(2). 
In [2013] NZCOP 7, the Tribunal, in its mock assessment of s 122(2) and s 122(3), 
considered the applicant’s submission which detailed the reliability of the detection 
methods.117 Assuming that s 122N(2) was engaged, then this would have ‘satisfied’ the 
Tribunal that the presumptions were correct per s 122N(3).118 However, the Tribunal 
highlighted that “satisfy” per s 122N(3) was a high threshold.119 It noted that the 
information provided regarding the evidence gathering method was thin and a fuller 
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explanation would be “preferable”.120 It also considered that other factual circumstances 
may “provoke a more testing exposition of these issues.”121   
Such factual circumstances may include where a respondent produces substantiated 
“evidence that” the presumptions should not apply per s 122N(2). Although, as 
established, evidence should not be required to engage s 122N(2) - an evidenced defence 
would demand a much higher standard of response in the form of s 122N(3).  
C   Case for removing presumptions 
Where a bare claim engages s 122N(2), it is likely that a low standard is required to satisfy 
s 122N(3). This may be justified on the grounds that it protects the presumptions from 
being defeated by spurious challenges by respondents. However, it may also lead to 
upholding the presumptions in the face of genuine cases of erroneous detection or bogus 
claims. Respondents will rarely have the means or ability to put up anything beyond a bare 
claim. As a result, in the majority of cases, s 122N(2) will only be engaged by a bare claim 
and the respondent only needs to provide a detailed description outlining the reliability of 
their detection method. Consequently, almost invariably, the evidentiary presumptions of 
s 122N(1) will operate in conjunction with s 122O(1) and impose a strict form of liability. In 
other words, if a copyright owner detects three infringements on an account holder’s 
account this will lead to an award being granted.  
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The evidentiary presumptions could be justifiably removed. This would require that in 
each case the applicant would have to prove an infringement occurred at the 
respondent’s IP address and that the notices were issued in accordance with the Act. This 
would reduce the expediency of the regime by restoring the evidentiary hurdles present 
prior to the Act. However, applicants (to date, exclusively RIANZ) possess the resources to 
overcome these hurdles and, conversely, respondents are ill-equipped to rebut 
evidentiary presumptions. Furthermore, expediency should not come at the risk of 
injustice posed erroneous detection and false claims. To prove that infringement 
occurred, respondents could detail their detection techniques. The Tribunal would have to 
assess whether these techniques were reliable. An independent Parliamentary assessment 
as to the reliability of the detection services employed by RIANZ could remove this burden 
from the Tribunal.  
VI   Conclusion 
File sharing software, like other historical developments in dissemination technology, has 
provoked the legislature into action. The Act represents an ambitious but ultimately 
flawed attempt to overcome the authorisation, detection and evidentiary hurdles involved 
in taking enforcement action against infringing file sharing. 
The decision to hold account holders vicariously liable for end user infringements eschews 
the evidentiary and authorisation hurdles allowing for a workable regime. However, in 
doing so, it gives rise to the potential for injustice. From a policy perspective, a clear 
assumption of responsibility should be found before imposing vicarious liability. An 
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advertisement campaign educating account holders as to these responsibilities would 
remedy this. Further steps could be taken to address certain fact patterns that have arisen 
in the Tribunal. The Act should contain discretion to charge end users where they admit to 
infringing activities. The information contained in infringement notices should contain 
information regarding prevention and detection of Wi-Fi hacking, so that account holders 
might be able to evidence claims indicating manifest unjustness. Similarly, these notices 
should hold detailed information about the uploading function of file sharing software and 
how to uninstall it. This would reduce the potential for inadvertent infringement. Finally, a 
fee limiting approaching could be adopted in the context of flagrancy in in order to 
establish a dichotomy between account holders directly infringing and those vicariously 
liable. 
The s 122N(1) presumptions pierce the evidentiary veil provided by file sharing. However, 
this comes at the cost of validating claims based on erroneous detections or altogether 
bogus claims. Section 122N(2) potentially assuages this risk. However, in reality 
respondents will only be able to muster bare claims towards s 122N(2). If accepted, these 
bare claims will likely be easily negated by applicant submissions under s 122N(3). The 
removal of the evidentiary presumptions could be justified based on the grounds of 
resource asymmetry between applicants and respondents. This would ensure an 
appropriate balance between expediency and justice. 
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